Christianity

the term “religion.” There was one major international effort to explain the underlying rights protected under the concept of religion or belief,[5] and the UN Human Rights Committee issued an important General Comment on the scope of freedom of religion or belief within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[6] Nevertheless, the term “religion” remains undefined as a matter of international law. The absence of a definition of “religion” is not peculiar to international human rights conventions; most national constitutions also include clauses on freedom of religion without defining “religion.”[7] Thus we are presented, on the one hand, with important provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights pertaining to religion, but on the other hand the term itself is left undefined. Of course, the absence of a definition of a critical term does not differentiate religion from most other rights identified in human rights instruments and constitutions. However, because religion is much more complex than other guaranteed rights, the difficulty of understanding what is and is not protected is significantly greater.[8]
It is fairly common for legal analyses of freedom of religion or belief to avoid a serious discussion of the definitional problem, even among the most
*** Top of Page 191 ***
important works.[9] Among non-legal scholars in philosophy and religion there is a very lively debate as to whether the word “religion” can or should be defined.[10] It has been observed that the “effort to define religion is as old as the academic study of religion itself.”[11] In fact, “dozens, if not hundreds of proposals have been made, each claiming to solve the definitional problem in a new and unique way. Needless to say, no one definition of religion has garnered a consensus, and the definitional enterprise, as well as the debate over the very need for definitions, continues in full vigor.”[12]
While academics have the luxury of debating whether the term “religion” is hopelessly ambiguous, judges and lawyers often do not. Asylum-case adjudicators, for example, may be called upon to decide whether there is a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of . . . religion” regardless of whether the 1951 Refugee Convention offers a definition.[13] Similarly, judges on the European Court of Human Rights may be required to give meaning to the term “religion” for purposes of interpreting Article 9 of the European Convention. Judicial decisions about what constitutes religion make a very real difference in the lives of persons who may or may not obtain refugee status, or in the economic viability of a group that may or may not be recognized as a tax-exempt religious association.[14]
*** Top of Page 192 ***
Asylum law is not the only place where the term “religion” is used in international human rights law, but it is probably the place that gives rise to the greatest number of cases where adjudicators make decisions based upon the meaning of the term.[15] In a study prepared for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Karen Musalo presented a detailed examination of religious persecution in refugee cases decided in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.[16] Musalo’s examination of the adjudicators’ decisions revealed, in many cases, serious misunderstandings not only about how “religion” is defined, but what religion is. Indeed, the adjudicators often appear to have made assumptions about the meaning of religion on the basis of their own experiences as members of the educated elite in western, industrial societies. Gvien Musalo’s detailed analysis, we can identify the following fairly typical misunderstandings of the nature of religion and religious persecution in refugee cases:
—assessing claimants’ credibility on the basis of their knowledge of the doctrines of their religions;
—assessing claimants’ credibility on the basis of the consistency of their personal behavior with the doctrines of their religion;
—failing to understand that religions sometimes persecute members of their own religious communities in order to ensure conformity with doctrines and practices;
—failing to understand the sometimes complex interrelationship of religious persecution and gender;
—failing to understand the sometimes complex interrelationship of religious persecution and ethnicity;
—failing to understand that what might initially appear to be only a minor inconvenience might reasonably constitute persecution to a claimant;
—failing to understand that persecutors’ attitudes toward religion may be more relevant for adjudicating a religious persecution claim than scholarly definitions of “religion”; and
—incorrectly assuming that “neutral laws” or “laws of general applicability” cannot cause religious persecution.
Thus, the most serious conceptual obstacles for adjudicators may derive from well-intentioned but mistaken assumptions about what religion means from
*** Top of Page 193 ***
their personal perspective or that of scholars rather than from the perspective of how religious discrimination and religious persecution are actually practiced. These mistaken notions regarding religion, which are found throughout asylum decisions, may well reveal underlying conceptual errors in the other cases involving freedom of religion or belief as well.
Part I of this Article will discuss some of the technical problems surrounding attempts to define “religion.” Part II will identify three facets of religion that should be more helpful in understanding discrimination and persecution than are definitions of the term “religion.” Part III will provide examples of how religious persecution and religious discrimination actually manifest themselves.
I. Difficulties in Defining “Religion”
In the three epigraphs at the beginning of this Article, neither the fictional Mr. Thwackum, the real English Charity Commission, nor the equally real U.S. Supreme Court was attempting to define “religion” for purposes of international human rights law.[17] The definitions nevertheless exemplify a variety of mistakes that have been made by adjudicators in refugee law as well as others attempting to interpret the meaning of “religion” in human rights law.[18]
A. The Underlying Methodological Difficulties in Defining “Religion”
There are two important aspects of definitions of religion. The first involves the underlying metaphysical assumptions about the nature of religion (what is being defined). The second involves the type of definition that is to be used (how the term is defined).
1. Assumptions about the Underlying Nature of Religion
Definitions of religion necessarily involve assumptions about its underlying nature. “[E]ach and every definition of religion implies at least some theoretical conclusions . . . .”[19] One of the many difficulties encountered in reaching a consensus on a legal definition of the term is that, at root, “no convincing general theory of religion exists.”[20] Three of the principal theories about religion are: first, religion in its metaphysical or theological sense
*** Top of Page 194 ***
(e.g., the underlying truth of the existence of God, the dharma, etc.); second, religion as it is psychologically experienced by people (e.g., the feelings of the religious believer about divinity or ultimate concerns, the holy, etc.); and third, religion as a cultural or social force (e.g., symbolism that binds a community together or separates it from other communities). Definitions of religion typically begin by assuming one of these three different theoretical approaches. Of course, even within each of these three approaches there will be widely different assumptions. Sigmund Freud and Rudolph Otto, for example, both focus on the psychological dimension of religion, though Freud saw religion as a set of false beliefs while Otto saw it as a powerful feeling of the Other.[21]
2. Types of Definition: Essentialist or Polythetic
Once the underlying theoretical assumptions are identified, there still remains the difficulty of the form that the definition will take.[22] Two of the most important forms of definition may be characterized as the “essentialist” and the “polythetic.”
An essentialist definition identifies the elements that are necessary for something to be designated as a “religion.” In the epigraphs at the beginning of this Article, Mr. Thwackum and the Charity Commissioners both offered essentialist definitions of religion. Thwackum’s essentialism reduced the meaning of “religion” to the “Anglican Church.” The Charity Commissioners apparently assume that religion must be theistic (and perhaps even monotheistic). Whenever a legal definition is essentialist, it assumes that religion has one or more elements in common with all other religions.
The second type of definition, the polythetic, does not require that all religions have specific elements in common. The most widely known illustration of a polythetic approach to definitions generally is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s explanation of the meaning of “game.” Wittgenstein described the wide variety of activities for which we use the term “game,” but notes that there is no single feature that all games have in common.[23] Yet, he believes, we can see resemblances among the different types of activity that are all called games, even if they do not share any features in common. “I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. overlap and
*** Top of Page 195 ***
criss-cross in the same way.”[24] The statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in the epigraph above approximates the polythetic approach when it accepts in the religious believer something “parallel” to the orthodox belief in God.[25]
The definitions contained in the epigraphs, as well as other definitions of “religion” (including legal definitions) typically can be analyzed in terms of the components above: the underlying assumptions about religion and the form of definition that is offered. Mr. Thwackum’s definition assumes the underlying metaphysical truth of the Church of England (i.e., it is not a psychological or sociological definition) and it is in the essentialist form. The Charity Commissioner’s definition, which is essentialist like Thwackum’s, nevertheless looks to psychology for the underlying nature of religion. The U.S. Supreme Court’s definition, like the Charity Commission’s, is psychological, but it is also polythetic.
B. Typical Deficiencies in Legal Interpretations of “Religion”
As discussed above, definitions of “religion” typically begin with assumptions about the nature of religion, and then are presented in either essentialist or polythetic form. Legal definitions of “religion” (whether in statutes or court decisions) follow this same general pattern. However, in addition to the difficulties that surround all attempts to define the term, legal definitions also must take into account other factors that standard definitions may ignore. Legal definitions of “religion” generally appear in the complicating contexts of either: (a) protecting freedom of religion, or (b) prohibiting discrimination (or persecution) of religion. Legal definitions do not simply describe the phenomenon of religion, they establish rules for regulating social and legal relations among people who themselves may have sharply different attitudes about what religion is and which manifestations of it are entitled to protection. Legal definitions, as a result, may contain serious deficiencies when they (perhaps unintentionally) incorporate particular social and cultural attitudes towards (preferred) religions, or when they fail to account for social and cultural attitudes against (disfavored) religions.
1. Incorporating Societal Value Judgments Regarding Familiar or Favored Religions
Statutory and judicial characterizations of religion may wrongly assume that familiar or favored creeds are real religions, while different or new creeds are either not religions or are only pseudo-religions. The most troubling examples of this deficiency are laws that differentiate between tradi-
*** Top of Page 196 ***
tional and non-traditional religions (as in Russia), or that differentiate between religions and sects (as in France). One extreme example from a judicial opinion is that of Judge Valticos on the European Court of Human Rights, who differentiates between the (acceptable) Greek Orthodox Church and the (unacceptable) Jehovah’s Witness faith. A member of the latter faith, who has been convicted in Greek courts for proselytism, is described by the judge as
a hardbitten adept of proselytism, a specialist in conversion, a martyr of the criminal courts whose earlier convictions have served only to harden him in his militancy . . . . He swoops on her, trumpets that he has good news for her (the play on words is obvious, but no doubt not to her), manages to get himself let in and, as an experienced commercial traveller and cunning purveyor of a faith he wants to spread, expounds to her his intellectual wares cunningly wrapped up in a mantle of universal peace and radiant happiness. Who, indeed, would not like peace and happiness?[26]
This language of Judge Valticos, although extreme, illustrates the bias that can enter into legal analysis. The epigraphs above from the Charity Commission and the U.S. Supreme Court are simply less blatant illustrations of the same problem.
Thus legal systems may explicitly or implicitly evaluate (or rank) religions. Depending on the attitudes of the evaluator, religions may be described in ways such as “good religion” versus “bad religion,” or, “religion” versus “non-religion.” Thus some might think of monotheistic religions in terms such as “traditional,” while polytheistic or non-theistic religions may be perceived as “primitive” or “superstitious.” Those with broader sensibilities might expand the traditional religions to include not only Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—but nevertheless find that other groups such as the Falun Gong or Scientologists are “not really religions” or are “sects” or “cults” and thus are not deserving of the label of “religion” either for purposes of receiving benefits or being protected against discrimination.
It is very common for legal systems to provide legal benefits to individuals or groups that are designated as “religious” (or some similar term). This, of course, leads many groups to seek the designation in order to obtain such privileges as tax benefits or legal personality. In some cases the designation serves principally to separate religious groups from other groups, such as sports clubs, political parties, or business entities. But, in many cases, the designation leads to a dispute between what is often considered to be “real” religion as opposed to “pseudo” religion. There are many pejorative terms that are used to describe such groups, including “sect,” “cult,” “splittist,”
*** Top of Page 197 ***
“heretic,” “apostate,” and “schismatic.” In some particularly extreme cases, adjectives will be piled onto these already pejorative terms and groups will be described, often without any supporting evidence, as “totalitarian sects” or “destructive cults.” Whereas scholars of religion, including sociologists and anthropologists, are generally critical of such derogatory labels, which typically derive from emotional hostility rather than from any systematically explained difference with more traditional religions, the attitudes may affect legal judgments as well.[27] The range of legal understandings of religion range from very broad (as in India) to very narrow (as in Saudi Arabia). Thus “religion” may be seen not simply as a neutral description of such things as theological beliefs or ritual practices, but as judgment on whether the particular beliefs or actions are acceptable to the society or the legal system.[28] Thus, a definition of “religion” may not simply be neutral, but may contain an inappropriate societal value judgment regarding particular beliefs or actions with “good” beliefs being characterized as “religions” and “bad” beliefs being characterized as “cults” or “heresies.”
2. Failing to Consider Religion from the Perspective of Its Adversaries
Conscientious jurists may attempt to overcome the definitional and societal limitations described above by consulting the works of scholars and experts, including anthropologists, sociologists, theologians, and historians of religion. These conscientious jurists might, for example, carefully examine definitions of religion offered by Emile Durkheim, Rudolf Otto, Paul Tillich, Max Weber, Clifford Geertz, or Joseph Campbell. But consulting such scholars will not necessarily explain what religion means in the context of “religious discrimination” because the scholarly definitions do not describe what religion means to those who are discriminating and persecuting. This problem can perhaps be seen more easily by looking to the analogous cases of discrimination on the basis of race or gender.
When asylum adjudicators, for example, are called upon to make determinations about racial persecution, it will probably be of no utility for them to seek a definition of “race” from experts such as biologists, geneticists, and anthropologists. In fact, under the prevailing viewpoint, race is not a scientific concept; indeed, it is sometimes argued that attempts to define “race” are themselves motivated by racism rather than by legitimate scientific in-
*** Top of Page 198 ***
terests. Regardless of whether race is a scientific category with biological or genetic markers, there is no doubt that racism exists and that people are persecuted because of their perceived racial characteristics. Ultimately, adjudicators of racial persecution cases would be remiss in seeking a scientific or expert definition of “race” as a prerequisite to determining whether racial persecution had occurred. What is needed is not an expert definition of “race,” but an understanding of whether an asylum applicant has suffered because of the persecutors’ belief that the applicant belongs to a disfavored race.[29]
Similarly, in gender discrimination cases, it is also likely to be unproductive to attempt to find a scientific definition of “sex.” Although it is easier to identify biologically based differences between males and females than it is to identify biologically based racial characteristics, the actual differences may have little or nothing to do with gender discrimination. In considering a definition of “sex,” a biologist would likely focus on the differences between male and female sexual organs. Yet it is perhaps the secondary-sex characteristics that, although only minimally relevant to a scientific definition of “sex,” may be more important for understanding gender-discrimination claims. Thus it presumably would be inappropriate for an adjudicator to ask a person claiming gender persecution whether she (or he) has had a hysterectomy (or an orchiectomy) or whether the applicant truly considers herself (or himself) to be a woman (or man).[30] While such questions arguably might be relevant to some notion of what is meant by sex or gender, they really are irrelevant if a woman cannot obtain work because potential employers refuse to hire women to work in public places. The relatively important issue in race and gender persecution, therefore, is not an “objective” or scholarly definition of the terms from the perspective of experts, but the understanding of race and sex from the perspective of the persons who are causing the persecution.
So it is the case with religion as well. We do not necessarily come closer to understanding “religious persecution” by considering whether religion requires either a belief in a divinity, a feeling of the transcendent or “wholly Other,” a belief in the supernatural, an “ultimate concern,” or community rituals—all of which are the types of issue typicaPatristic father, Saint John Chrysostom, described Judaism as follows:
I should say that the synagogue isn’t only a brothel and a theatre, but also a cave of robbers and a resting-place for wild beasts. . . . When God abandons (a people), what hope of salvation is left? When God abandons (a place), that place becomes the dwelling of demons.[31]
China offers a more contemporary example. In banning the Falun Gong movement, the Chinese government has stated that:
Li Hongzhi fabricated the so-called Falun Gong by copying some qi gong practices and adding a lot of superstitious beliefs and ravings. Li propagated the explosion of the earth and the doomsday fallacy to fool the public. These malicious concepts have already resulted in physical and mental injuries and even death of people, undermining social stability. Falun Gong bears strong resemblance to heterodox groups like Branch Davidian in the United States and Japanese Aum Doomsday Cult.
. . . .
Falun Gong organization, advocating malicious fallacies, has put people’s life at risk and wreaked havoc on the society.[32]
In such cases, whether it be St. John Chrysostom or the Chinese government, the tenor of the allegations exceeds the weight of the evidence offered, as if the rhetoric itself may be substituted for proof. As conceived by one of the most important psychologists of prejudice, such attitudes are “ordinarily a matter of gross and unwarranted overgeneralizations [that reflect] contempt, rejection, or condescension . . . .”[33] To people subjected to abuse flowing from such attitudes, it should not matter whether they ever attend synagogue or whether they consider Falun Gong to be a “spiritual movement” rather than a “religion.” In short, the relevant issues for adjudicators may not be the religious beliefs or religious activities from the perspective of religious communities or academics studying religion, but the attitudes of those who are causing the religious persecution.

spirituality

Members of an organized religion may not see any significant difference between religion and spirituality. Or they may see a distinction between the mundane, earthly aspects of their religion and its spiritual dimension.
Some individuals draw a strong distinction between religion and spirituality. They may see spirituality as a belief in ideas of religious significance (such as God, the Soul, or Heaven), but not feel bound to the bureaucratic structure and creeds of a particular organized religion. They choose the term spirituality rather than religion to describe their form of belief, perhaps reflecting a disillusionment with organized religion (see Major religious groups), and a movement towards a more "modern" — more tolerant, and more intuitive — form of religion. These individuals may reject organized religion because of historical acts by religious organizations, such as Christian Crusades and Islamic Jihad, the marginalisation and persecution of various minorities or the Spanish Inquisition. The basic precept of the ancient spiritual tradition of India, the Vedas, is the inner reality of existence, which is essentially a spiritual approach to being.

Mysticism focuses

Mysticism focuses on methods other than logic, but (in the case of esoteric mysticism) not necessarily excluding it, for gaining enlightenment. Rather, meditative and contemplative practices such as Vipassanā and yoga, physical disciplines such as stringent fasting and whirling (in the case of the Sufi dervishes), or the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD, lead to altered states of consciousness that logic can never hope to grasp. However, regarding the latter topic, mysticism prevalent in the 'great' religions (monotheisms, henotheisms, which are perhaps relatively recent, and which the word 'mysticism' is more recent than,) includes systems of discipline that forbid drugs that can damage the body, including the nervous system.
Mysticism (to initiate) is the pursuit of communion with, or conscious awareness of ultimate reality, the divine, spiritual truth, or Deity through direct, personal experience (intuition or insight) rather than rational thought. Mystics speak of the existence of realities behind external perception or intellectual apprehension that are central to being and directly accessible through personal experience. They say that such experience is a genuine and important source of knowledge.
Esotericism is often spiritual (thus religious) but can be non-religious/-spiritual, and it uses intellectual understanding and reasoning, intuition and inspiration (higher noetic and spiritual reasoning,) but not necessarily faith (except often as a virtue,) and it is philosophical in its emphasis on techniques of psycho-spiritual transformation (esoteric cosmology). Esotericism refers to "hidden" knowledge available only to the advanced, privileged, or initiated, as opposed to exoteric knowledge, which is public. All religions are probably somewhat exoteric, but most ones of ancient civilizations such as Yoga of India, and the mystery religions of ancient Egypt, Israel (Kabbalah,) and Greece are examples of ones that are also esoteric.

universe and human life

Religious belief usually relates to the existence, nature and worship of a deity or deities and divine involvement in the universe and human life. Alternately, it may also relate to values and practices transmitted by a spiritual leader. Unlike other belief systems, which may be passed on orally, religious belief tends to be codified in literate societies (religion in non-literate societies is still largely passed on orally[21]). In some religions, like the Abrahamic religions, it is held that most of the core beliefs have been divinely revealed.
Religious belief can also involve causes, principles or activities believed in with zeal or conscientious devotion concerning points or matters of ethics or conscience, not necessarily limited to organized religions.[22]

Related forms of thought

Religion and science
Main article: Relationship between religion and science
Religious knowledge, according to religious practitioners, may be gained from religious leaders, sacred texts (scriptures), and/or personal revelation. Some religions view such knowledge as unlimited in scope and suitable to answer any question; others see religious knowledge as playing a more restricted role, often as a complement to knowledge gained through physical observation. Some religious people maintain that religious knowledge obtained in this way is absolute and infallible (religious cosmology).
The scientific method gains knowledge by testing hypotheses to develop theories through elucidation of facts or evaluation by experiments and thus only answers cosmological questions about the physical universe. It develops theories of the world which best fit physically observed evidence. All scientific knowledge is subject to later refinement in the face of additional evidence. Scientific theories that have an overwhelming preponderance of favorable evidence are often treated as facts (such as the theories of gravity or evolution).

Early science such as geometry and astronomy was connected to the divine for most medieval scholars. The compass in this 13th century manuscript is a symbol of God's act of creation.
Many scientists have held strong religious beliefs (see List of Christian thinkers in science) and have worked to harmonize science and religion. Isaac Newton, for example, believed that gravity caused the planets to revolve about the Sun, and credited God with the design. In the concluding General Scholium to the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, he wrote: "This most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets and Comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being." Nevertheless, conflict has repeatedly arisen between religious organizations and individuals who propagated scientific theories that were deemed unacceptable by the organizations. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, has in the past[23] reserved to itself the right to decide which scientific theories were acceptable and which were unacceptable. In the 17th century, Galileo was tried and forced to recant the heliocentric theory based on the medieval church's stance that the Greek Hellenistic system of astronomy was the correct one.[24][25]
Many theories exist as to why religions sometimes seem to conflict with scientific knowledge. In the case of Christianity, a relevant factor may be that it was among Christians that science in the modern sense was developed. Unlike other religious groups, as early as the 17th century the Christian churches had to deal directly with this new way to investigate nature and seek truth.
The perceived conflict between science and Christianity may also be partially explained by a literal interpretation of the Bible adhered to by many Christians, both currently and historically. The Catholic Church has always held with Augustine of Hippo who explicitly opposed a literal interpretation of the Bible whenever the Bible conflicted with Science. The literal way to read the sacred texts became especially prevalent after the rise of the Protestant reformation, with its emphasis on the Bible as the only authoritative source concerning the ultimate reality.[26] This view is often shunned by both religious leaders (who regard literally believing it as petty and look for greater meaning instead) and scientists who regard it as an impossibility.
Some Christians have disagreed or are still disagreeing with scientists in areas such as the validity of Keplerian astronomy, the theory of evolution, the method of creation of the universe and the Earth, and the origins of life. On the other hand, scholars such as Stanley Jaki have suggested that Christianity and its particular worldview was a crucial factor for the emergence of modern science. In fact, most of today's historians are moving away from the view of the relationship between Christianity and science as one of "conflict" — a perspective commonly called the conflict thesis.[27][28] Gary Ferngren in his historical volume about Science & Religion states:
While some historians had always regarded the [conflict] thesis as oversimplifying and distorting a complex relationship, in the late twentieth century it underwent a more systematic reevaluation. The result is the growing recognition among historians of science that the relationship of religion and science has been much more positive than is sometimes thought. Although popular images of controversy continue to exemplify the supposed hostility of Christianity to new scientific theories, studies have shown that Christianity has often nurtured and encouraged scientific endeavour, while at other times the two have co-existed without either tension or attempts at harmonization. If Galileo and the Scopes trial come to mind as examples of conflict, they were the exceptions rather than the rule.[29]
In the Bahá'í Faith, the harmony of science and religion is a central tenet.[30] The principle states that that truth is one, and therefore true science and true religion must be in harmony, thus rejecting the view that science and religion are in conflict.[30] `Abdu'l-Bahá, the son of the founder of the religion, asserted that science and religion cannot be opposed because they are aspects of the same truth; he also affirmed that reasoning powers are required to understand the truths of religion and that religious teachings which are at variance with science should not be accepted; he explained that religion has to be reasonable since God endowed humankind with reason so that they can discover truth.[31] Shoghi Effendi, the Guardian of the Bahá'í Faith, described science and religion as "the two most potent forces in human life."[32]
Proponents of Hinduism claim that Hinduism is not afraid of scientific explorations, nor of the technological progress of mankind. According to them, there is a comprehensive scope and opportunity for Hinduism to mold itself according to the demands and aspirations of the modern world; it has the ability to align itself with both science and spiritualism. This religion uses some modern examples to explain its ancient theories and reinforce its own beliefs. For example, some Hindu thinkers have used the terminology of quantum physics to explain some basic concepts of Hinduism such as Maya or the illusory and impermanent nature of our existence.
The philosophical approach known as pragmatism, as propounded by the American philosopher and psychologist William James, has been used to reconcile scientific with religious knowledge. Pragmatism, simplistically, holds that the truth of a set of beliefs can be indicated by its usefulness in helping people cope with a particular context of life. Thus, the fact that scientific beliefs are useful in predicting observations in the physical world can indicate a certain truth for scientific theories; the fact that religious beliefs can be useful in helping people cope with difficult emotions or moral decisions can indicate a certain truth for those beliefs. (For a similar postmodern view, see grand narrative).

Religion, metaphysics, and cosmology

This section requires expansion.
Being both forms of belief system, religion and philosophy meet in several areas - notably in the study of metaphysics and cosmology. In particular, a distinct set of religious beliefs will often entail a specific metaphysics and cosmology. That is, a religion will generally have answers to metaphysical and cosmological questions about the nature of being, of the universe, humanity, and the divine.